Beyond the 115 charges: what the Manchester City ruling really says about football finance regulation

Wollens’ Sports Law team have read the Core Decision finally reached in the regulatory proceedings against Manchester City so that you don’t have to. This is what we found.

The decision is of exceptional and unprecedented gravity. The significance is magnified by the fact that the decision concerns the club which has dominated the modern Premier League era.

But whilst an independent Premier League Commission has found almost all the charges against the club proved, Manchester City denies every charge and has lodged an appeal.

That is significant.

The Commission’s conclusions are now formal findings rather than unproven allegations, but they are not yet the final word.

The case continues to carry major legal and sporting consequences, not only for the club, but for the credibility of financial regulation across English football.

What were the charges?

On 6 February 2023, the Premier League referred ‘well over 100’ alleged rule breaches by Manchester City to an independent Commission.

These allegations fell into four broad areas:

  1. Inaccurate financial reporting: failures between 2009/10 and 2017/18 to provide financial information giving a true and fair view of the club’s financial position, particularly in relation to sponsorship income, related party transactions and operating costs, including failures to include full remuneration details in manager and player contracts, such as those linked to image-rights.
  1. UEFA financial rules: breaches of Premier League rules requiring compliance with UEFA’s Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations between 2013/14 and 2017/18.
  1. Profitability and Sustainability Rules: breaches of the domestic PSRs between 2015/16 and 2017/18.
  1. Cooperation with the investigation: failures to cooperate with the League’s investigation with utmost good faith from December 2018 onwards.

The hearing

The substantive hearing took place over 42 days between September and December 2024. Oral evidence occupied 34 days. 27 factual witnesses were cross-examined. Millions of documents were scrutinised. The core hearing bundle ran to tens of thousands of pages. The legal authorities exceeded 300 items.

It took 21 months to reach a decision.

Given the exceptional size and complexity of the case, a lengthy deliberation period was foreseeable.

But even the Commission has acknowledged it is ‘regrettable’.

The delay creates real practical difficulties and an uncomfortable reality, exposing a broader weakness in football regulation: any sanction will now apply to a different squad competing in a different season. Enforcement loses its bite when judgment arrives only after the money has been spent, the trophies won and the competitive consequences become irreversible.

This may feature in Manchester City’s appeal if delay in the decision can be linked to a material error, procedural unfairness or identifiable prejudice.

However, delay alone would not normally invalidate the decision. It would more likely mitigate against any sanction(s) imposed, rather than defeat liability.

What are the findings?

On 29 September 2026, the Commission published its redacted 40-page Core Decision.

It found every principal charge proven except one sub-charge relating to the cooperation case. The detailed reasoning is contained in 37 appendices, which have not yet been published.

The central finding was that the club had operated a ‘Disguised Funding Scheme’.

The findings suggest that for nine consecutive seasons, sophisticated owner-linked arrangements defeated the League’s financial safeguards and concealed the club’s true financial position from both regulators and external auditors.

It found that sponsorship agreements with Abu Dhabi-based sponsors recorded substantial commercial fees, but that the sponsors were only liable for a smaller ‘Base Sum’. The balance, described as the ‘Tagged Sum’, was funded by the club’s owner, Abu Dhabi United Group Investment & Development Ltd (ADUG), and should have been recorded as an equity contribution rather than commercial revenue.

Why the accounting treatment mattered

The accounting distinction between sponsorship fees and equity funding is significant.

Owner equity was not treated as relevant income for the applicable financial break-even calculations, whereas genuine commercial sponsorship revenue could be.

Across the nine seasons from 2009/10 to 2017/18, the Commission found that £949.94 million was recorded as sponsorship income. Of that amount, it found that £119.25 million was paid by the sponsors as base fees, while £830.69 million represented owner-funded sums that should have been treated as equity. Accordingly, the findings indicate that sponsors only paid 12.6% of recorded sponsorship fees.

The Commission also made an alternative finding.

It held that, even if its findings about the disguised source of the funds were wrong, the relevant sponsorships were related-party transactions and should have been reduced to fair market value for financial-regulation purposes. Accordingly, the club would still have failed both the UEFA break-even requirements and the domestic PSRs.

That layered reasoning may be important on appeal.

To overturn the regulatory consequences, Manchester City will need to displace not only the Commission’s primary conclusions about the source and character of the funding, but also its alternative findings about related parties and fair market value.

Importantly, an appeal is not ordinarily a complete re-hearing simply because the losing party disagrees with the factual conclusions.

Findings based upon extensive oral evidence and cross-examination may be difficult to disturb unless an appellant can demonstrate a material error in the Commission’s reasoning, approach to the evidence or application of the rules.

The Commission also found that, once the figures were corrected and the club’s omitted expenses were included, Manchester City exceeded both UEFA’s and the Premier League’s permitted loss limits by a ‘very substantial amount’. This made greater expenditure possible while preserving the appearance of compliance, potentially creating a competitive advantage when making squad investments.

A competitor reporting its position correctly might instead have had to restrict recruitment or sell players to remain compliant.

The impact

The Club spent £1.2 billion on players between 2009 and 2018.

To name a few examples, Carlos Tevez (£25 million, 2009) scored 74 goals for City, helping them to win their first Premier League title in 2011/12, and the FA Cup in 2010/11.

Yaya Toure (£24.9 million, 2010) scored the winning goals in both the semi-final and final of the FA Cup, ending the club’s 35-year trophy drought. 

David Silva (£23.8 million, 2010) won four league titles, two FA Cups and five League Cups with City.

In 2011, Sergio Aguero became a City player for a then club-record signing of £38 million. He went on to become the Club’s record goal scorer, as well as scoring the goal that secured their first Premier League title on goal difference from rivals Manchester United.

Kevin De Bruyne signed for City in 2015, for another record transfer fee of £54.3 million. He holds the Club’s record for assists, won four consecutive League titles and the treble of League title, FA Cup and Champions League in 2022/23.

In 2017/18, City made their biggest transfer spend of a total £286.2 million, which included record transfer fees for defenders Kyle Walker and Benjamin Mendy. During this season, City recorded 100 points in the Premier League with a record 106 goals to be branded the ‘Centurions’.

The relationship between exceptional transfer spending and sustained on-field success is difficult to ignore. Without that financial firepower, it is doubtful that City could have assembled the squad that delivered such an extraordinary haul of trophies.

Project Longbow and the Fordham Arrangement

The Commission’s decision also examined ‘Project Longbow’, an initiative established in 2012 to explore ways of increasing revenue and reducing operating losses. The short-term aim was to avoid making a record loss in a single Premier League season.

The Commission accepted that many strands of the project were genuine and legitimate.

Its criticism focused on the ‘Fordham Arrangement’. This involved the Club buying players’ image rights for artificially inflated prices. The Commission described the third-party Fordham as being ‘little more than a front for ADUG’.

The Commission concluded £49.414 million in image-rights costs should have appeared as operating expenses of the club. It also concluded that £24.5 million recorded as operating income should instead have been treated as an ADUG equity contribution.

Taken together, the findings concern both sides of the profit-and-loss calculation: the Commission found that income had been inflated while costs were concealed, making the club’s financial position appear substantially stronger than it was.

The Premier League summarised the aggregate effect as inflating revenue and reducing costs by more than £900 million during the relevant period.

Sham agreements and economic substance

One of the most important legal points is that the decision was not confined to whether the sponsorships had been valued too generously.

The Commission’s primary conclusion went further: it found that the relevant agreements were shams, meaning that the documents did not represent the parties’ true agreement. It found that some sponsorship agreements were even modified without the sponsors’ knowledge, to ‘plug’ shortfalls and fund a US tour.

The decision identifies three ‘sham’ remuneration arrangements funded with ADUG money, involving amounts of £8.866 million, £7.4 million and £500,000. The Commission found that these were liabilities of the club which had not been properly recorded in its contractual or accounting records.

This depicts the picture that Manchester City, one of the global pioneers of twenty-first century football, treated financial and regulatory compliance as an optional goal rather than a mandatory limit, in order to gain competitive advantages both on and off the field.

The findings align with economic substance over contractual form. A written sponsorship agreement is not necessarily decisive if the evidence shows that the financial reality was materially different.

Financial controls could be easily avoided if clubs were able to rely entirely on the wording of contracts, invoices or payment origins, while funding travelled through a different route.

Clubs should ensure that sponsorships are commercially genuine, properly valued, transparently funded and fully disclosed, particularly where an owner, state-linked entity or wider corporate group is involved.

Non-cooperation and regulatory authority

The Commission further found that Manchester City intentionally made ‘concerted efforts to stop and frustrate’ the Premier League investigation.

That finding may seriously weaken any attempt by Manchester City to rely on undue delay. A party found to have obstructed the investigation will face an obvious difficulty in criticising the time the process ultimately took or prove that it was attributable solely to the Commission.

Cooperation is the lifeblood of effective sports regulation. A sports regulator is only as effective as the information it can obtain.

Unlike the police, tax authorities or statutory regulators, private governing bodies generally cannot compel evidence using extensive investigative powers. Their ability to uncover wrongdoing therefore depends on clubs responding candidly, promptly and completely. A failure to cooperate does not merely obstruct an investigation; it strikes at the regulator’s ability to enforce the rules and can constitute serious misconduct in its own right, whatever the outcome of the underlying allegations.

The League had also reserved the possibility of alleging further non-cooperation based upon inaccurate, dishonest or misleading statements. However, that allegation was not formally added to Charge 4 and was not pursued at the hearing. The Commission therefore declined to determine it.

The Commission also declined to make findings on how the Club secured sponsorship involvement, based on contested expert evidence about the structure of the Emirate’s state. This narrow finding substantially increases the difficulty of an appeal.

Such restraint is a powerful marker of procedural fairness: the Commission only made findings on the charges properly pleaded, argued and tested before it.

Evidence, credibility and standard of proof

The Premier League’s case depended partly upon circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from contemporaneous documents, payment structures and witness testimony. The Commission acknowledged that the evidential picture was incomplete as there were numerous missing documents.

The applicable standard was the civil standard – whether a charge was proved on the balance of probabilities.

However, because the allegations involved serious wrongdoing, ‘strong, cogent evidence’ was required before making findings of dishonesty or deliberate concealment. This reflected the need for evidence capable of carrying the full weight of those severe conclusions.

The Commission also made a particularly serious finding that certain witnesses knowingly gave untrue evidence.

This is far more serious than a finding that they were mistaken or unreliable.

It entitled the Commission to place less weight on their accounts and to make adverse inferences that the truth, had it been disclosed or confessed, would have damaged the case being advanced. It may also have strengthened the Commission’s assessment of competing documentary and circumstantial evidence.

It does not, however, automatically establish perjury or separate criminal liability.

Manchester City’s response and appeal

The Club’s argument was that some sponsors had received financial assistance from the Abu Dhabi government, rather than payments being disguised equity funding from ADUG.

The Commission rejected that explanation.

It found that the explanation had been developed after the event, and certain documents had been generated to reassure sponsors that their actual liabilities would not exceed the smaller base fees and to conceal the true arrangements from regulators and auditors. The fact ADUG increased the amount it was contributing via the ‘Tagged Sum’ by around 20% per year challenges the argument that the contributions were merely part of a transitional phase. The published decision does not, however, determine whether any auditor, sponsor or other third party incurred separate legal responsibility.

The Commission’s conclusion was stark: this was an intentional scheme involving concealment and knowledge or recklessness at club level.

Following publication of the decision, the Club said it was ‘disappointed and surprised’, maintained that it was innocent and asserted that a comprehensive body of evidence supported its position. It said the decision contained material errors ‘of law, principle and fact’ and was unsafe.

The club lodged its appeal on 1 October 2026. The Premier League confirmed the appeal on 2 October and stated that the Appeal Board proceedings would remain private and confidential until publication of the outcome is permitted.

Why the 2020 CAS case was different

The present proceedings must be distinguished carefully from Manchester City’s earlier dispute with UEFA.

In February 2020, UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body imposed a two-season European competition ban and a €30 million fine.

On appeal, the Court of Arbitration for Sport set that decision aside. CAS found that most of the alleged breaches were either not established or time-barred. It nevertheless found a failure to cooperate and reduced the fine to €10 million.

The 2020 CAS ruling was neither a wholesale vindication of Manchester City’s historical commercial arrangements nor a barrier to the Premier League pursuing its own case. But the domestic Commission could not simply inherit UEFA’s allegations as established fact. It had to test the evidence afresh and reach its own conclusions under the Premier League’s own rules, evidential records and limitation provisions.

This time, the proceedings cannot be appealed to CAS.

CAS does not operate as a universal appellate court for sporting disputes; it only has jurisdiction where the governing rules or an arbitration agreement confer it. The Premier League Rules instead provide a domestic appeal before an independent Appeal Board, reflecting the member clubs’ agreement that League disputes should be determined within the English regulatory framework.

The wider consequences for football

The case is no longer simply about whether the Premier League could prove a technical breach of its accounting rules.

It is a major test of whether financial rules are genuinely enforceable against even the wealthiest and most sophisticated clubs, or whether complexity and resources can place meaningful accountability beyond reach.

The deeper concern is not simply what happened, but why the Premier League failed to uncover it, exposing an uncomfortable enforcement gap. The conduct found by the Commission began 17 years before the ruling, surfaced through externally obtained material rather than the League’s own safeguards, and the result was leaked within 24 hours.

Competitive integrity requires more than rules on paper.

Clubs must know that financial limits will be applied consistently. Financial rules lose their force if enforcement arrives after the sporting consequences have become irreversible.

Yet speed cannot come at the expense of justice: allegations of this scale demand rigorous scrutiny, careful analysis of complex financial evidence and a full opportunity for the club to answer the case against it.

The case could reshape the rulebook itself.

Regulators are likely to demand sharper disclosure duties, direct access to underlying financial records and tougher powers to compel cooperation. In return, clubs will insist that greater regulatory reach is matched by precise rules, transparent procedures and adjudicators whose independence is beyond doubt.

What remains unresolved?

The Commission has delivered a landmark ruling but several important questions remain unanswered.

What sanction, if any, will be imposed?

Can any sanction adequately address the scale and duration of the breaches?

Will the Appeal Board uphold, vary or overturn any, or all, of the Commission’s findings?

Will any further appeal be permitted?

What practical consequences may follow for sponsors, auditors and other clubs?

Could another club establish a legally recoverable loss arising from missed prize money, European qualification or relegation? Such issues would require separate legal and factual analysis. 

Conclusion: why the case matters

For Manchester City, the appeal is an opportunity to challenge findings which the club says are legally and factually unsafe.

For the Premier League, its regulatory credibility is on trial. This case will test whether its rules can withstand scrutiny when the financial and sporting stakes could scarcely be higher.

This article is intended for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. If your club, governing body or sporting organisation requires advice on governance, disciplinary or regulatory matters, please contact Wollens’ Sports Law Division.

Speak to Katie Leary

Katie is a Trainee Solicitor at Wollens and can advise you. Contact Katie via email Katie.Leary@wollens.co.uk or call 01392 648669.

Katie Leary - Wollens Solicitors Devon

You can also complete an online enquiry form. One of the Wollens team will contact you as soon as they are available.

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